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explaining the identity of entrepreneurs. Keynes adopted this model but
transformed it when he emphasized the short-period and volatile
character of long-term expectations. This entails a view of entrepreneur
identity in which radical uncertainty plays a central role. This in turn
deepens the post Keynesian view of uncertainty as ontological in that
entrepreneurs’ survival plays into their behavior. This paper explores
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Keywords: identity, uncertainty, Marshall, Keynes, post Keynesian
economics, expectations
JEL Classification: B13, B22, D53, D84, E12

When the capital development of a country becomes a byproduct of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be illdone (Keynes 1973 [1936], 159).
[…] though this state of affairs would be quite compatible with
some measure of individualism, yet it would mean the
euthanasia of the rentier (Keynes 1973 [1936], 375-376).

Keynesianism in the tradition of Keynes
economy in time guided by individuals’
There is no permanent state of rest in
equilibria that emerge are temporary and

is a theory of a monetary
expectations of the future.
a monetary world, and the
transient. But this does not
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imply that everything in the economy is in flux. Not often appreciated is
that this view of the economy implies a conception of economic agents
as enduring through change. Economic agents act today on expectations
about an economy that they themselves expect to face tomorrow.
Whether or not their expectations about the economy are fulfilled, and
however the economy changes, they nonetheless act on the assumption
that they continue as essentially who they are—else it would make little
sense to make plans for tomorrow. That is, though the economy is a
system of change, and though much also changes in the characteristics
of economic agents, including the disappearance of some (through
bankruptcy or voluntary withdrawal), when economic agents act, they
act as if they retain their respective identities through time. The concept
of agent identity, then, is an implicit tenet of Keynesianism and a
correlate of the idea of a monetary economy as a system of change.
From this perspective, Keynesianism is thus a theory of the economy in
time based on the idea that there are agents who survive through time
by managing the consequences of time.
Post Keynesians, of course, have extensively investigated the role
of expectations in the economy, but relatively little post Keynesian
research investigates the properties of economic agents specifically seen
as enduring beings, particularly those agents under the greatest burden
of negotiating time, namely, entrepreneurs and investors (in contrast to
consumers and workers who are generally treated as largely passive
agents). However, it can be argued that the theory of uncertainty in
Keynes’s later thinking and in post Keynesianism offers a basis for
explaining the identity of agents when its ontological dimension is
emphasized.
Uncertainty in an ontological sense means that what occurs in the
world is not predetermined by some set of economic ‘fundamentals’
underlying behavior (Davidson 1996). This entails that what individuals
do today can have an impact on what happens tomorrow, leading them
to form expectations about what effects they can have on what happens
to them tomorrow. Thus expectations in an ontologically uncertain
world have a dual character in that they refer to both identity (of
economic agents) and change (in the economy). Accordingly, the basis
for investigating the nature of economic agents as enduring beings
can be found in Keynes’s thinking about individuals’ formation of
expectations in an uncertain world.
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This paper attempts to develop a modest analysis of this last
proposition. It does so by looking back to the roots of Keynes’s thinking
about time in his inheritance of Marshall’s thinking about time and
subsequent critique of that thinking. The argument builds on my
previous work on the identity of individuals, where I proceed in an
ontological-criterial manner, evaluating different candidate conceptions
of the individual in economics according to whether ‘individuals’ as they
are described can indeed be regarded as distinct and re-identifiable, as
is required by the concept of an individual (Davis 2003; Davis
forthcoming). I use that framework here, but focus not on individuals in
general but rather on the particular type of individual responsible for
the central role investment plays in Keynesian and post Keynesian
thinking, namely, the individual/entrepreneur, whose identity is
explained in both Marshall and Keynes in terms of asset holdings. My
general conclusion is that the departure Keynes made from Marshall’s
view of the identity of the individual/entrepreneur is important for
understanding investment in monetary economies guided by
individuals’ expectations of the future. Thus identity matters to our
understanding of the economy.
Of course neither Marshall nor Keynes reasoned explicitly in terms
of agent identity. Yet they both made claims about the nature of the
entrepreneur that bear on what the identity of the entrepreneur
involves. Both their conceptions, moreover, satisfy my individuation and
re-identification criteria, though Keynes’s view of time and uncertainty
in a post-Victorian, post-‘fundamentals’ world has altogether different
consequences for our understanding of the economy. Let me add that an
additional implication of the approach taken in the paper is that
different types of agents have different types of identities, so that the
functioning of the economy needs to be understood in terms of the
interaction of identifiably different (or heterogeneous) types of
economic agents. I do not discuss this implication here, but restrict the
paper to the topic of the identity of the individual/entrepreneur.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I
briefly review Keynes’s thinking about uncertainty and its appraisal in
recent post Keynesian economics in connection with the emphasis
placed on ontological as opposed to epistemological uncertainty. Here I
also attempt to explain why the investigation of agent identity may be of
value to post Keynesianism, in order to motivate interest in the
argument of the paper. The second section discusses the antecedents of
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Keynes’s thinking about entrepreneurs in time in Marshall’s early theory
of asset market equilibria dating back to his 1871 essay on “Money”,
which Keynes praised. It then uses this discussion to reconstruct a
Marshallian theory of the agent identity of the individual/entrepreneur.
The third section turns to Keynes’s own approach to asset market
analysis, emphasizes its departures from Marshall’s understanding,
and then constructs an alternative view of the agent identity of
individuals/entrepreneurs appropriate to Keynes’s view of the economy.
Section four offers brief summary remarks regarding the status and
nature of individual/entrepreneur identity in a world in which
Keynesian economic policy dominates.

1. KEYNES ON UNCERTAINTY
Keynes’s thinking about uncertainty originally derives from his thinking
about the concept of probability and the weight of arguments in his
1921 Treatise on probability. In the Treatise, uncertainty has both
epistemological and ontological dimensions. Regarding his concept of
probability, understood to mean the degree of belief individuals may
have in uncertain propositions, he distinguishes four cases:
There appear to be four alternatives. Either in some cases there is
no probability at all; or probabilities do not all belong to a single set
of magnitudes measurable in terms of a common unit; or these
measures always exist, but in many cases are, and must remain,
unknown; or probabilities do belong to such a set and their
measures are capable of being determined by us, although we are
not always able so to determine them in practice (Keynes 1973
[1921], 33, original emphases).
The first case clearly concerns an ontological claim, and was
famously emphasized many years later in Keynes’s 1937 defense of his
The general theory of employment, interest and money (1936), in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics. There Keynes asserted that with respect
to long-term investment decisions, “there is no scientific basis on which
to form any calculable probability whatever” (Keynes 1973 [1937], 113).
The three other cases are more epistemological in nature. The second
concerns non-comparability and accordingly the limits of our knowledge
in regard to how probability is to be measured; the third concerns what
can and cannot be known regarding probabilities that exist; the fourth
concerns the limitations imposed on knowledge associated with our
practices regarding data generation and estimation procedures.

VOLUME 3, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2010

36

DAVIS / UNCERTAINTY AND IDENTITY: A POST KEYNESIAN APPROACH

Regarding the weight of arguments, Keynes is there concerned with the
amount and completeness of the relevant evidence an agent has
regarding the probability of a given outcome. Low weight refers to
insufficient and/or incomplete evidence, which is an epistemological
concern. This concept of weight re-appears in The general theory in
connection with Keynes’s emphasis on how the ‘state of confidence’
affects investment: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to
attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain”, whereas, “It is
reasonable […] to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about
which we feel somewhat confident” (Keynes 1973 [1936], 148; see Runde
1990).
That Keynes understood uncertainty to be both epistemological and
ontological, and placed special emphasis on the latter, is argued by
Davidson and others to be particularly important for understanding
Keynes’s view of the economy (Davidson 1996; also McKenna and
Zannoni 2000-2001; Rosser 2001; Dequech 2003, 2004, 2006; Wilson
2009). Where epistemological uncertainty is involved it is possible that
individuals may learn the probabilities relevant to their decision-making,
but where ontological uncertainty is involved no such learning is
possible. In that instance, Davidson follows Shackle (1972) in saying this
implies that some states of the world are not predetermined but remain
to be determined as a result of the actions we undertake. The economy
is nonergodic. Or as Dequech puts it, “under fundamental uncertainty,”
that is, ontological uncertainty, “the innovator creates new opportunities
and new states of the world” (Dequech 2003, 527).
Important to this argument is whether states of the world that are
not predetermined are nonetheless possible under the laws of nature,
since it can be argued that if they are possible then the innovator cannot
really create them. Creativity can still be maintained in a weaker sense
as the idea that innovators help bring about particular possible states of
the world—which ones depending on their actions—and thus help
realize the future under conditions of fundamental uncertainty (see
Wilson 2009). Another issue is whether people moderate and reduce
uncertainty through recourse to rules of thumb and conventions which
tend to determine future states of the world, a matter emphasized by
Keynes in connection with his account of investment behavior (Keynes
1973 [1936], 152). In effect, strategies for reducing epistemological
uncertainty also reduce ontological uncertainty.
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However we assess these issues, it is still fair to say that Keynes’s
thinking about uncertainty gave special emphasis to ontological
uncertainty, and that this gives the economy a nonergodic, historical, or
even evolutionary character in which agents’ actions play a creative role.
Note, then, that this ‘creative’ role can explain dynamic growth in the
economy when ‘animal spirits’ are high, and it can also lead to quite
destructive economic consequences when long-term expectations are
disappointed or there is damaging speculative behavior that depresses
output. A nonergodic world has no predetermined pathway, and thus
our interest lies in what the effects of agents’ actions are. Keynes’s
interest, of course, was in their consequences for output and
employment. Yet he certainly knew that behind these aggregate
phenomena individuals are also affected, even if this was not a subject
he often specifically addressed. Thus, taking economic agents as
relatively enduring, might we also ask in parallel fashion how their
identities are affected as a result of their actions? If there is no
predetermined pathway for the economy, then it seems there is also no
predetermined identity pathway for its agents. It follows that we must
include in our analysis of undetermined possible future states of the
world what may happen to the individuals as well.
I suggest there are two rationales for this extension. One is that it
potentially offers a deeper understanding of the nature of long-term
expectations. Long-term expectations are often simply treated as
subjective, or as perhaps depending on group dynamics and average
expectation as in Keynes’s beauty contest explanation. But it may be
that we can add to this understanding if it can be argued that agents’
orientation toward the future reflects a concern regarding the extent to
which their identities as entrepreneurs are at risk.1 The second rationale
lies in the possible advantages of better understanding Keynes’s reliance
on and revision of Marshall’s early asset market equilibrium thinking,
which Lawlor argues “became Keynes’s basic supply and demand metatheory for asset markets” (Lawlor 2006, 28). My suggestion is that our
understanding of this too can be enhanced with a better understanding
of the agents concerned with portfolio management. In the following
1
In my earlier discussion of how Keynes’s philosophical thinking developed (Davis
1994) I make interdependent belief expectations central to Keynes’s The general theory
(Keynes 1936) understanding of conventions and average expectation. That argument,
however, is not framed in terms of entrepreneur identity, but rather in terms of
Keynes’s rejection of his own early philosophical thinking as inspired by G. E. Moore’s
intuitionism (Moore 1903).
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section I begin from this latter vantage point, and argue that it
offers an early framework for explaining the agent identity of
entrepreneurs/individuals. The section after looks at how Keynes
revised this asset market equilibrium framework, and comments on the
implications this has for thinking about the personal identity of
entrepreneurs as creative agents.

2. MARSHALL’S ASSET MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND ENTREPRENEUR IDENTITY
The 1871 essay on “Money”
The earliest source of Marshall’s asset market equilibrium analysis is
his 1871 essay on “Money”, later published by Whitaker (Whitaker 1975;
see Lawlor 2006, 108ff.). Marshall began with a complaint about the
monetary theory of his time. He pointed out that the standard
explanations of the value of money were not formulated in terms of the
same systematic supply-and-demand analysis used in the determination
of the exchange value of commodities, but were rather formulated in
terms of such things as money’s rapidity of circulation or its cost of
production. He then argued that it was individuals’ determination to
hold a stock of money that determined its value, and that these
decisions were not made in isolation from their decisions to hold
other assets. Consequently, since the demand for all assets involves a
balancing of the opposing advantages the individual expects to derive
from each, the value of money needed to be determined in terms of its
relative advantages and disadvantages compared to all other assets
individuals held. Marshall put this in terms of the simple choice one
might face between owning a productive asset—his example is a horse—
and holding a stock of non-interest bearing coin. Whether one wants the
horse or the coin depends on how one chooses to apportion one’s
wealth given the respective ‘conveniences’ and ‘inconveniences’ of these
two assets at the margin. The value of money, then, was established in
the same way as the value of any other asset through supply-anddemand and marginalist reasoning.
From an equilibrium perspective, individuals are consequently seen
as being in a state of equilibrium with respect to their portfolio choices
over different wealth holdings. At the same time, however, individuallevel equilibrium analysis needs to be accompanied by a market-level
equilibrium analysis, since the market values of all assets individuals
hold are equalized by the forces of supply and demand in the trading
between individuals. Thus Marshall’s general asset market equilibrium
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analysis sees each entrepreneur as being in individual equilibrium, and
equilibrium simultaneously obtaining between all entrepreneurs with
respect to all the different possible assets people can hold. Moreover, as
an analysis of assets the framework is intertemporal. Productive assets
can generate returns in the future, and money provides the means for
transactions people wish to carry out today (one liquidity motive, as we
would call it). Thus as individuals make their portfolio choices they do
three connected things: they determine what combination of assets best
suits their own individual situations, they make their own positions
consistent with those of others, and they do all this over time.
Entrepreneur identity
Let us then treat this analysis as a framework for explaining
entrepreneurs’ agent identities as manifested by their asset holdings. In
the most basic sense, identity analysis is simply an accounting system
for keeping track of some kind of distinguishable entity through a
process of change that is believed to be important for the purposes of
some explanation. If you claim you can refer to some type of
distinguishable, persisting entity you think important to your analysis,
in principle you need to be able to show what makes that entity a
separate and distinct thing in terms of how you have described it, and
then show how you can track it as that separate and distinct thing
through a process of change that may alter many of its characteristics.
Explaining the identity of that entity then makes it possible to go on to
argue how it may or may not function as a causal agent, able to affect its
environment as well as be affected by it. In economics, of course, we are
concerned with economic agents, and in Keynesian and post Keynesian
economics we are interested especially in one particular type of
economic agent, the entrepreneur, or, in Marshall’s framework, the
individual managing a set of asset holdings. Thus, explaining
individuals’/entrepreneurs’ agent identities as manifested by their
asset holdings involves mobilizing some essential description of
individuals/entrepreneurs that allows us to individuate and track them
over time despite change in their non-essential characteristics, such as
which particular assets they hold in their portfolios, who they trade with
and when, and the like.
I suggest, then, that the ‘essential description’ of the
individual/entrepreneur that Marshall offers in his 1871 essay includes
three connected things entrepreneurs do when they make portfolio
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choices, and which are instrumental to their characterization as
distinguishable, enduring entities with agent identities. First and most
basically, individuals are distinguishable independent beings in virtue of
their exclusive identification with the assets which they own. That is, the
system of private ownership for stocks, bonds, real estate, bank
deposits, and so on, provides a straightforward means of distinguishing
entrepreneurs as independent agents. Second, it nonetheless goes too
far to say that entrepreneurs are isolated atomistic beings, since for
Marshall the actual values of the assets they own are determined in
interaction with other entrepreneurs. As what they are made up of is not
just a matter of the assets they hold but also obviously a matter of the
value of those assets, entrepreneurs are only relatively autonomous and
thus both independent and
also interdependent beings. Third,
Marshall’s entrepreneurs are also enduring, re-identifiable beings in
that, whatever the mix of assets they happen to own, their wealth
portfolios are always seen as being in equilibrium at any point in time
and thus through time as well.
This equilibrium property is crucial because it elicits what is
essential in entrepreneurs’ identity as asset-holders when there is
continual change in the mix of assets they own. Were they to be
identified solely as collections of assets without the equilibrium
principle, they would then be collections of multiple selves, each
different from moment to moment according to changes in their
portfolios. But here individuals are enduringly distinct beings, because
their identities are tied to their ability to exercise an equilibrium
principle regarding the management of their asset holdings—the idea of
balancing the conveniences and inconveniences of different assets at the
margin. With these three components in mind, then, let us go on to see
what further interpretation we can give to this agent identity conception
by looking at Marshall’s later treatment of time and his distinction
between short-term and long-term expectations in his Principles (1920).
In the Principles Marshall provides a ‘real’ theory of interest in terms
of the demand and supply of capital. Long-term expectations are driven
by the productivity of capital which motivates investment decisions,
whereas short-term expectations are determined by current production.
Further, long-period values, or ‘normal’ values, reflect the deep
underlying factors such as the marginal productivity of resources,
marginal disutility of saving, and so forth, that Marshall believed
ultimately explain the functioning of the economy. Short-period
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phenomena depend on other more transient factors, and accordingly
adjust in the long run to the former. Applying this to the asset market
equilibrium characterization of individuals above, it follows that
individuals ultimately guide their lives by long-term expectations
regarding their durable investments. That is, the mix of assets in their
portfolios reflects thrift and steadfastness in their preference for
holding long-term investments, at the expense of liquidity and frequent
adjustment to one’s holdings.
Hedging and speculation cannot pay off in the long run for Marshall
because they are responses to transitory phenomena out of keeping
with the fundamentals underlying the economy. Consequently,
entrepreneur/individual identities are, as it were, highly secure in that
stability in their personal portfolios through time gives their identities
an enduring nature. Put differently, as their identities are securely
distributed across time by this long-term orientation, despite the
continuous process of transitory change in markets, they are effectively
‘out’ of time. Their equilibrium identity principle, that is, allows them to
defeat time by organizing their identities around the deep, timeless
values residing in fundamental scarcity relationships that for Marshall
hold between human life and nature. We thus might say that this late
nineteenth century concept of entrepreneur identity is classically
Victorian in that the established values of thrift and hard work
associated with that era underlie the pre-eminent role that long-period
‘normal’ values in Marshall’s economic analysis play in individuals’
organization of their lives vis-à-vis time.

3. KEYNES ON ASSET MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND ENTREPRENEUR IDENTITY
Keynes on Marshall and asset market equilibria
To understand Keynes’s thinking on asset market equilibria, I begin with
his adoption and re-assessment of Marshall’s distinction between the
short-period and long-period. As a Marshallian, Keynes used Marshall’s
time distinction, but his development of the idea of the economy as a
monetary economy made short-period equilibrium the key concept, and
not a temporary state ultimately overcome by the gravitational pull of
long-period forces as was the case for Marshall. This inversion of
Marshall’s thinking followed from Keynes’s changed view of the
character of long-term expectations. Thus for Keynes, as essentially with
Marshall, short-term expectations are concerned with the price the
entrepreneur can get for finished output, and are generally fulfilled, or
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revised in a predictable way, in light of market performance. But in
contrast to Marshall he believed that long-term expectations, which are
concerned with future returns on additions to the entrepreneur’s capital
stock, were often disappointed, and moreover it is often unclear to the
entrepreneur why this was the case. Keynes inferred from this that longterm expectations consequently never really settle down and, absent a
rational basis in the calculation of expected returns, are driven by
investors’ animal spirits. Part of the reason for this was that the rise of
stock markets, associated with the historical shift in capital holdings
away from privately-held family/entrepreneur firms toward rentiertype investors, made long-term expectations more changeable and
unpredictable. The development of stock markets also gave rise to
speculative behavior. In contrast to Marshall’s late nineteenth/early
twentieth century experience, then, it was simply no longer clear what
drove long-period expectations. Keynes recognized this historical
development, and consequently shifted the focus of Marshallian analysis
from the long-period to the short-period to give “the theory of a system
in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the
present situation” (Keynes 1973 [1936], 293). In fact, for Keynes there is
really no longer any long-period as everything occurs in the present.
Rather the long-period, as Lawlor says, is “just a succession of changing
regimes of long-period expectation” that impacts us from one present to
the next (Lawlor 2006, 19).
Given this, Keynes still held a high opinion of the basic ideas
involved in Marshall’s monetary theory as well as of the asset
equilibrium model on which it depended. In his biography of Marshall
(Keynes 1925), the content of the 1871 essay and Marshall’s early
monetary thinking in general were discussed quite favorably. (Indeed,
Keynes specifically requested a copy of the essay from Mary Paley
Marshall in order to write the biography.) But Keynes’s later
development of this framework in The general theory also significantly
changed it by expanding upon the reasons individuals might find some
assets to be ‘convenient’ to include speculative expectations regarding
their possible appreciation.
The idea of speculative expectations, of course, was entirely foreign
to Marshall’s thinking since it allows for expectations not grounded in
real factors but rather in transitory phenomena. It also introduces a
dimension into the determination of asset values altogether at odds
with Marshall’s thinking about individual behavior, since speculation
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allows opinion to influence individuals (such as Keynes described in his
beauty contest example), and draws them away from the economy’s
fundamentals. For Marshall, the deep factors that determine economic
behavior lay in the relationship between human beings and nature, not
between human beings per se. That is, social relationships for him
needed ultimately to be somehow ‘naturalized’.
Keynes on entrepreneur identity
How, then, does all this change the Marshallian entrepreneur identity
conception for Keynes? In Marshall’s asset equilibrium model of
entrepreneur identity, the entrepreneur’s identity is sustained across
change in the variety of assets that make up the entrepreneur’s portfolio
through the entrepreneur’s preference for holding long-term
investments. In effect, if we look at entrepreneur identity in terms of
how entrepreneurs position themselves towards time, the particular
interpretation Marshall gives to this, by favoring long-term investments,
gives individuals an identity through time largely through their
minimizing the significance of time. People endure as entrepreneurs
because they make choices with respect to their holdings that make
time unimportant. However, in inverting Marshall’s expectations
analysis, Keynes produces quite a different view of entrepreneur
identity. As the short-period becomes the only period and time
contracts to the present, entrepreneurs shift their portfolios away from
long-term commitments, constantly revising the mix of assets that they
own. The unsettled character of long-term expectations, then, removes
their ability to be ‘out’ of time, forcing them to be ever ‘in’ time in the
sense that they are ever changing what they own and thus who they are.
Accordingly, in Keynes’s world entrepreneurs cease to be enduring, reidentifiable agents. Rather entrepreneurs fragment into successions of
unconnected episodic selves, where the most that can be said to link
each entrepreneur’s multiple selves is their common desire for shortterm portfolio gain.
Moreover, on Keynes’s view entrepreneur identity is always at risk.
When entrepreneurs are identified with the assets they own, then, since
they no longer maintain long-term positions as the core of their
portfolios, should they sustain serious losses they are threatened with
elimination as agents and individuals altogether. On an asset identity
model of the entrepreneur, that is, their losses are not to a financial
portfolio separate from the individual but in fact losses to the individual
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identified with that portfolio. Thus, just as a financial portfolio might go
bankrupt and cease to exist, so might the entrepreneur identified as a
portfolio go bankrupt and cease to exist. In our ordinary way of
thinking, of course, we maintain a separation in our minds between
individuals and what they own, allowing us to imagine that individuals
continue and may somehow sustain their identities should they go
bankrupt and cease to be wealth owners. But the analysis here does not
distinguish between agent identity and personal identity, and indeed in
the economic world as Marshall and Keynes described it individuals are
subsumed by the roles they play in the economy, so that difference
arguably does not exist there either. Thus, in a world that has become
thoroughly economic in nature, the risk that Keynesian entrepreneurs
face in losing their ‘identity’ portfolios makes the unsettled character of
long-term expectations an even more serious matter.
It is not just an institutional change in the way market economies
began to work in the early twentieth century with the rise of stock
markets and speculative investing that then underlies Keynes’s shift of
focus to the present and changed view of long-term expectations. When
we take the basis for entrepreneurs’ agent identity to be the Marshallian
asset equilibrium model, Keynes’s changed view of the world also
signals a different understanding of the culture of the market system
whereby uncertainty becomes a deeply ontological concern for
entrepreneurs themselves. For them, accordingly, radical uncertainty is
not only about what entrepreneurs cannot know about the future (an
epistemological uncertainty), but also ultimately about whether they
themselves may even exist in the future (an ontological uncertainty).
Part of Keynes’s view, we saw, is the special emphasis he places on
the role that opinion plays in the determination of entrepreneurs’ asset
choices. Given the analysis of entrepreneur identity above in terms of
independence, interdependence, and enduringness, what more does this
then imply about the identities of entrepreneurs? Note that since
opinion is not grounded in timeless Marshallian ‘fundamentals’ but is
rather the product of a social interaction that can produce swings in
investor sentiment, it can generate both bull and bear markets. In the
former entrepreneurs profit when they go long and hold assets for
extended periods, whereas in the latter they profit when they go short
by borrowing and selling assets forward. Thus whether entrepreneurs
take a long-term perspective going long or a short-term perspective
going short is in large part a matter of the state of opinion. And,

ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS

45

DAVIS / UNCERTAINTY AND IDENTITY: A POST KEYNESIAN APPROACH

ironically, opinion-driven bull markets inadvertently produce a
Marshallian-like world from the point of view of entrepreneur identity,
since they encourage individuals to hold long-term positions.
But Keynes had no confidence that such a circumstance would
prevail over any significant period of time. It should not be overlooked
accordingly that, in the last chapter of The general theory, Keynes
argued for ‘socializing investment’ and for the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’
as means by which he hoped stability and growth might be brought to
capitalist market systems. Of course he was not advocating socialism or
state take-over of the economy—“[i]t is not the ownership of the
instruments of production which it is important for the State to
assume” (Keynes 1973 [1936], 378). Rather, he was interested in whether
the state could develop policies and strategies which might influence
the nature of entrepreneur behavior by encouraging long-term holding
of capital assets and reducing short-termism in the way entrepreneurs
approached their asset portfolios. That is, Keynes essentially sought the
state’s assistance in ensuring a more stable climate of opinion that
would channel entrepreneurs’ animal spirits in the direction of a more
Marshallian-like world.
In terms of the view of entrepreneur identity set forth here, Keynes
hoped public authorities might help stabilize the opinion-influenced
interdependence component of entrepreneur identity and thereby
reframe entrepreneur independence in such a manner as to restore their
status as enduring, re-identifiable agents. Markets themselves already
threatened to euthanize the rentier. Keynes was willing to lend his
assistance, particularly as a step in the direction of ensuring the survival
of the entrepreneur as the key economic agent in the capitalist market
economy. But this required more realism regarding the social side of the
entrepreneur as well as practical measures aimed at changing how
interdependence figured in entrepreneur identity.

4. KEYNES AFTER MARSHALL
Thus Keynes is still a Marshallian, albeit one who learned from the
history he experienced. He shares the Marshallian entrepreneur
identity conception implicit in the asset equilibrium model, but his
understanding of the early twentieth century evolution of asset markets
caused him to think more deeply than Marshall had about entrepreneur
interdependence. This reflects two ways in which Keynes’s ontological
view of the world was different from Marshall’s. First, though the
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structure of Marshall’s model is retained, and though Marshall’s longrun normal values are preserved, they are not retained as ‘natural’
normal values but rather as socially-produced normal values. Contrary
to Marshall, human beings play an important role in determining the
relationship between the economy and nature and do not find that
relationship naturally given to them in the form of a collection of pregiven ‘fundamentals’. Second, in a Keynesian world with socially desired
economic policy in command, individuals are again ‘out’ of time, and
thus confident in making long-term commitments that ignore the risk of
time, but they are so only when they produce consensus in opinion
regarding employment and output goals—a matter strictly ‘in’ time in
the sense of requiring social recognition of the need to manage time.
That is, as post Keynesians argue, we only succeed in managing the
consequences of time and uncertainty when we see the economy as
inescapably in time, that is, as a monetary economy.
The Victorian world Marshall inhabited ended in 1914 when it could
no longer be said that the values of thrift and hard work explained an
economic process embedded in a world of conflict and power. The
Victorians saw the world as benign and beneficent, as befit the privilege
and illusions of Britain’s upper classes which benefited from decades of
ruthless colonial expansion that had made its victims invisible. The war
that began in 1914 was in part a product of this nineteenth century
history, which afterward wrought further damage on the national
economies that fought it in the form of economic depression and a
second world war.
Keynes was raised in this Victorian world, but by 1918 and Versailles
he was immune to most of its illusions, including that thrift and hard
work were the natural foundations of economic life. By the end of his
life he was even more aware of the nature of the kind of world that had
succeeded Marshall’s. One aspect of this was his worry about the
fragile state of human society, famously expressed in his cautions in
“My early beliefs” (1933), and later given more tangible expression in his
important contributions to the postwar deliberations at Bretton Woods
in 1944. From an uncertainty perspective, more was involved here, I
suggest, than his concern about the well-being of the international
economic system. Implicitly, he was also concerned with whether
individuals were likely to be able to live ‘in’ time in a world in which
they so increasingly identified with the roles they occupied in economic
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life. It is an important concern, but one that has gone largely
unaddressed by economists since Keynes’s time.
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